St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 10

Number 3

Article 15

9-1-1979

Supplemental Voir Dire Is Required When Significant Delay Occurs
between Jury Selection and Start of Trial.
Larry E. Reed

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Larry E. Reed, Supplemental Voir Dire Is Required When Significant Delay Occurs between Jury Selection
and Start of Trial., 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. (1979).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss3/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Reed: Supplemental Voir Dire Is Required When Significant Delay Occurs

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

the second sovereignty with the consent and cooperation of the first refuses
to give testimony, comity restricts the second sovereignty from compelling
or coercing the prisoner to testify."5 The lending doctrine, which focuses on
the consent of the first sovereignty, is therefore only effective when the
prisoner is willing to testify in the second jurisdiction. In answer to the
Liberatoreview, the argument can be made that when the first sovereignty
consents to lend the prisoner to testify, it also consents to the coercive
measures which the second jurisdiction may use. Lending of a prisoner
would otherwise be useless. Preventing the second sovereignty from imposing a civil contempt sentence would restrict the second sovereignty to
the remedy of criminal contempt. Although a criminal contempt sentence
would punish the contemnor for his failure to testify, it would not aid the
court in securing his testimony."
In re Liberatore is important for two reasons. It is the first case dealing
with federal interruption of a preexisting state sentence to coerce a contemnor by tolling his sentence. The decision reaffirms the principle of separate
and distinct sovereignties of state and federal governments. It is also the
first decision indicating that a federal court does not have the power to
interrupt a federal sentence. Liberatore's dicta, rejecting the opinions of
seven courts of appeals and narrowly interpreting the Recalcitrant Wit-.
nesses statute," advocates a new and more restrictive interpretation. The
Liberatore decision hinders the ability of a federal grand jury or a court to
elicit testimony or evidence from a recalcitrant witness who is already
incarcerated.
Diane E. Hepford

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--Juries-Supplemental Voir Dire Is Required When Significant Delay
Occurs Between Jury Selection and Start of Trial
United States v.Price,
573 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1978).
On March 8, 1977, the cases of Jose Mireles, indicted for conspiracy to
possess and distribute cocaine, and George Price, indicted for possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute, were called for jury selection. The
attorneys for Price and Mireles moved to quash the venire as the attorneys
thought the jury members might participate in similar trials or trials in88. In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 88 (2d Cir. 1978).
89. See United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420.U.S.
980 (1975); Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 913 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975).

90. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
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volving the same witnesses between the time of their selection and the start
of the trial. The motion was denied and the juries were selected. The jury
for the Mireles case was instructed to return for trial forty-nine days later
on April 27, 1977, and the jury for the Price case was ordered to return on
April 21, 1977, forty-three days later. Immediately prior to trial, counsel
for defendants renewed their motion to quash, but the motions were denied
once more. After trial both defendants were convicted and their cases were
joined on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Price and
Mireles contended the trial court erred in refusing to quash the jury panel
because of the interim jury service performed by some of the jurors in
similar cases or in cases in which the same government witnesses testified.
Held-Reversed and remanded. When a significant delay occurs between
selection of the jury and the start of the trial, the trial court has a duty to
conduct a supplemental voir dire.'
The purpose of voir dire is to aid the parties to a lawsuit in obtaining
the impartial jury guaranteed them under the sixth amendment.2 Biased
jurors may be removed during the voir dire by use of challenges to the
venire.' Two types of challenges exist: peremptory and for cause.' No limit
is placed on the number of challenges that may be made for cause," but a
juror is only subject to such a challenge if he is unqualified or if he is shown
to be biased." No grounds need be given for peremptory challenges,7 but
1. United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 1978).
2. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975)(defendant must have panel of impartial jurors); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973)(primary purpose of
voir dire is to empanel an impartial jury); The United States Courts of Appeals: 19761977 Term CriminalLaw and Procedure,66 Gao. L.J. 203, 495 (1977). The sixth amendment
reads in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. I . ." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
. 3. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1970); Note, Voir
Dire: EstablishingMinimum Standardsto Facilitatethe Exercise of Peremptory Challenges.
27 STAN. L. REv. 1493, 1498-99 (1975).

4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1970); 2 C. WRoIH, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 382, at
31 (1969); Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of
Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1493, 1498-99 (1975).
5. See Jackson v. United States, 408 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir. 1969); Wilson v. Wiggins,
94 P.2d 870, 871 (Ariz. 1939); State v. Arbeitman, 313 A.2d 17, 19 (Vt. 1973).
6. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980,
984 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969); 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1970 & Supp. V 1975);
2 C. WIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 383, at 38 (1969). To qualify for federal jury
duty a person must meet certain qualifications: United States citizenship; at least eighteen
years of age; at least one year of residence within the district; ability to read, write, speak
and understand the English language; no mental or' physical infirmity affecting capability;
and no pending charge or conviction of a state or federal crime punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year and not restored by amnesty or pardon. 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975).

7. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965)(peremptory challenges exercised
without stating reason); United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1975)(reasons
need not be stated when exercising peremptory challenges), cert. denied,425 U.S. 961 (1976).
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the number of peremptory challenges is generally limited by statute.' Prior
jury service generally does not disqualify a prospective juror,' and bias
sufficient for a challenge for cause is not implied by prior jury service, even
if the juror has served in a similar trial." To be entitled to such a challenge
based on the prospective juror's knowledge of the case or his prior jury
service, counsel must prove actual bias of the juror." Although the trial
court is given wide discretion in the method and extent 3 of the examination of jurors, such examination must provide counsel opportunityto obtain sufficient information on which to base their challenges."
In addition to the initial voir dire, a trial court has discretion to permit
reexamination of jurors who have already been accepted." Counsel, however, is usually not permitted to question sworn jurors further and refusal
to allow additional questioning is generally not reversible error." Before
conducting a reexamination, a court may first require counsel to satisfy
certain requirements, such as setting aside the impaneling of the jury or
8. See FED. R. CaiM. P. 24; 2 C. Wuor, FEDERAL PRAMCE AND PROCEDURE: §§ 384-385,
at 43-44 (1969).
9. See United States v. Spinelli, 446 F.2d 646, 647 (9th Cir. 1971)(per curiam), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614, 615 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963).
10. United States v. Ochoa, 543 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States
v. Reibschlaeger, 528 F.2d 1031, 1032 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976); Virgin Islands v. Hendricks, 476 F.2d 776, 778 (3d Cir. 1973).
11. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); see United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980,
984 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969); Casias v. United States, 315 F.2d 614,
618 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963).
12. See Howard v. Swenson, 293 F. Supp. 18, 22 (E.D. Mo. 1967)(collective poll of jurors
within trial court's discretion), aff'd, 404 F.2d 469, 473 (8th Cir. 1968); Cohen v. State, 195
A. 532, 535 (Md. 1937)(discretionary with trial court to allow counsel to question jurors), cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 660 (1938); The United States Courts of Appeals: 1976-1977 Term Criminal
Law and Procedure,66 GEO. L.J. 203, 495 (1977) (whether judge or attorneys ask questions
on voir dire is within trial court's discretion).
13. See Kreuter v. United States, 376 F.2d 654, 656-57 (10th Cir. 1967)(within trial
court's discretion not to question jurors to extent requested), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1015
(1968).
14. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950)(defendant guaranteed opportunity to prove actual basis); United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir.)(challenges worthless unless counsel obtains sufficient information), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 297
(1977); United States v. Montelongo, 507 F.2d 639, 641 (5th Cir. 1975)(defendant entitled to
knowledge of prior jury duty).
15. United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234, 1240 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1102 (1977); State v. Rasor, 167 S.E. 396, 401 (S.C. 1933); State v. Lopez, 406 P.2d 941, 943
(Wash. 1965).
16. United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234, 1240 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1102 (1977); People v. Wheeler, 100 Cal. Rptr. 198, 211 (Ct. App. 1971); see Brown v. People,
238 P.2d 847, 851 (Colo. 1951)(trial court did not err in refusing reexamination); Albright v.
State, 191 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)(waiver of right to have attorney until after
voir dire does not give right to reexamine jurors), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 862 (1967); State v.
Gibbs, 168 S.E.2d 507, 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969)(refusal does not violate defendant's right to
fair trial).
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showing sufficient facts to merit reexamination. 7 Several state court decisions have allowed additional questioning of the jury when new facts come
to the knowledge of one of the parties after the jury's acceptance," and
when something occurs in a juror's personal life after his selection to disqualify him."' *
Several recent Fifth Circuit decisions have dealt with the problem of
possible bias of jurors who have served at another trial during the interim
between their initial selection and the beginning of the trial." In United
States v. Mutchler2 ' the court held that interim jury service in a similar
trial or in a trial in which the same witnesses appeared rendered the prior
voir dire and peremptory challenges meaningless.22 Mutchler was interpreted in United States v. Jefferson23 to mean that interim jury service is
a sufficient ground for a challenge for cause. 2 These decisions have established interim jury service in a similar trial or in a trial in which the same
witnesses appear as an additional test for challenges for cause. 25 The Fifth
Circuit diluted the holdings of Mutchler and Jefferson, however, in United
States v. Eldridge.2" In Eldridge the court determined that the defendant
has the, duty to raise the propriety of interim jury service prior to the
commencement of the trial, and failure to do so would waive an objection
2
based on interim jury service. '
In United States v. Price2 counsel was unable to introduce positive
evidence of jury service between the voir dire and the start of the trial to
meet the test established in Mutchler and Jefferson.2" The issue of interim
17. See Maddox v. State, 102 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ind.1951)(impaneling jury); Schissler v.
State, 99 N.W. 593, 597 (Wis. 1904)(sufficient cause to reexamine).
18. State v. Hashimoto, 377 P.2d 728, 733 (Hawaii 1962); see Sullivan v. State, 125 So.
115, 116 (Miss. 1929)(prosecution discovered one juror not qualified).
19. See State v. Crane, 100 S.W. 422, 430 (Mo. 1907)(newspaper accounts of the crime
and the impaneling of the jury); State v. Hottman, 94 S.W. 237, 241 (Mo. 1906)(purported
confession in newspaper when jury not sequestered).
20. See United States v. Eldridge, 569 F.2d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Jefferson, 569 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mutchler, 559 F.2d 955, 958 (5th
Cir. 1977), opinion amended, 566 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1978).
21. 559 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1977), opinion amended, 566 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1978).
22. Id. at 958; see United States v. Montelongo, 507 F.2d 639, 641 (5th Cir. 1975)(must
have opportunity to develop nature and extent of prior jury service).
23. 569 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1978).
24. Id. at 263; cf. State v. Krohn, 514 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Or. Ct. App. 1973)(can challenge
individual juror, not array, for service in companion case).
25. See United States v. Jefferson, 569 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Mutchler, 559 F.2d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1977), opinion amended, 566 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1978).
26. 569 F.2d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1978).
27. Id. at 320; see United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
28. 573 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1978).
29. Id. at 364. To meet the interim service test it must be shown the juror served at a
similar trial or when the same witnesses testified. See United States v. Jefferson, 569 F.2d
260, 262 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mutchler, 559 F.2d 955, 960 (5th Cir. 1977), opinion
amended, 566 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1978).
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jury service had not been waived as in Eldridge as objections had been
made prior to trial.30 As a result, the Fifth Circuit was presented with the
question whether the defendants were entitled to a new trial without a
showing of interim service. 3' Its prior decisions relating to interim jury
service were held inapplicable due to the lack of any evidence of interim
service.3 The court recognized, however, that not only interim jury service,
but also occurrences in everyday life may affect the impartiality of a
juror.

As a result, the court determined that when a significant lapse of

time occurs between the selection of the jury and the commencement of
the trial an obligation arises to conduct supplemental voir dire.34 When
permissible, therefore, counsel should be allowed additional challenges in
order to effectively use the information acquired during the reexamination
of the jury.-- The court emphasized that the obligation to conduct supplemental voir dire was limited to those cases in which a significant delay
occurs."6
In Price the Fifth Circuit went beyond prior decisions by adding a new
test of supplemental voir dire to assure the parties of juror impartiality. 3
The effect of the Price decision on obtaining an impartial jury is twofold.
First, an independent test of supplemental voir dire after a significant
delay has been added to the interim jury service test of Mutchler." On
appeal the appellate court will not only look at whether the trial court
permitted challenges for cause for jurors with interim service, but it will
also determine whether there was a lapse of time between jury selection
and trial that warranted additional voir dire, and, if so, whether that
supplemental voir dire was properly granted. 3 Failure of the trial judge to
provide such a reexamination of the jury constitutes reversible error. 0 An
30. United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 1978).
31. Id. at 363.
32. Id. at 364.
33. Id. at 363-64; see State v. Hashimoto, 377 P.2d 728, 733 (Hawaii 1962)(trial publicity); State v. Crane, 100 S.W. 422, 430 (Mo. 1907)(trial publicity); State v. Hottman, 94 S.W.
237, 241 (Mo. 1906)(trial publicity).
34. United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1978); cf. People v. Wheeler, 100
Cal. Rptr. 198, 211 (Ct. App. 1971)(trial court discretion to permit reexamination); Brown v.
People, 238 P.2d 847, 851 (Colo. 1951)(discretion of court); State v. Farley, 290 P.2d 987, 990
(Wash. 1955)(reexamination within discretion of court), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
35. United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1978).
36. Id. at 365.
37. Id. at 365.
38. Compare United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1978)(applies only when
a significant delay occurs) with United States v. Mutchler, 559 F.2d 955, 960 (5th Cir.
1977)(applies in all cases when there has been interim jury service), opinion amended, 566
F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 1978).
40. See United States v. Montelongo, 507 F.2d 639, 641 (5th Cir. 1975)(reversible error
if defendant not given opportunity to develop nature and extent of prior service); cf. United
States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1976)(procedure must give reasonable assurance
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additional effect of Price is that it allows counsel to question the jurors in
an effort to uncover situations justifying application of the Mutchler test."
Thus, the Price decision. may serve both an independent function and a
complementary function.
Although Price gives counsel an additional opportunity to determine
whether the jury is impartial, the decision is limited by the requirement
that a significant delay occur before the right to supplemental voir dire
arises.12 The likelihood of a juror becoming prejudiced naturally increases
with time, but a short delay may also prejudice a juror.4 3 A juror is more
likely to serve on another jury during a significant lapse, of time," but
events affecting a juror's disposition toward one of the parties or toward
the offense may occur in the jurors' personal lives in a much shorter period
of time." In one early state case, the right to reexamine jurors was granted
after a delay of only two days." By giving the trial court discretion over
the determination of significant delay, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
the time period is necessarily flexible, but implied, by emphasizing
"significant," that its holding would not apply to delays of only a few
days."
The wide discretion of the trial court in conducting the voir dire of the
jury is subject to the protection of the defendant's rights." Price replaces
the trial court's discretion with a duty in regard to the reexamination of
jurors after a significant delay;" however, the determination of what constitutes a significant delay remains within the discretion of the judge. '1 As
during initial voir dire, the scope and nature of the questioning at the
that any prejudice will be discovered); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir.
1972)(procedure must be such that any prejudice would probably be discovered), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 970 (1973).
41. Compare United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1978)(only requirement
is significant delay) with United States v. Mutchler, 559 F.2d 955, 960 (5th Cir. 1977)(must
show interim service with same witnesses or in similar trial), opinion amended, 566 F.2d 1044
(5th Cir. 1978).
42. See United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 1978)(must be a significant
delay); cf. State v. Hashimoto, 377 P.2d 728, 733 (Hawaii 1962)(no time limit).
43. Compare United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1978)(forty-nine days)
with44.
State v. Hottman, 94 S.W. 237, 241 (Mo. 1906)(two day delay).
See United States v. Jefferson, 569 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1978)(forty-nine
day
delay).
45. See State v. Crane, 100 S.W. 422, 430 (Mo. 1907)(adverse publicity); State v. Hottman, 94 S.W. 237, 241 (Mo. 1906)(adverse publicity).
46. See State v. Hottman, 94 S.W. 237, 241 (Mo. 1906).
47. See United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 1978)(discretion about what

constitutes "significant delay"); cf State v. Hashimoto, 377 P.2d 728, 733 (Hawaii
1962)(complete discretion).
48. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950); United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d
1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1976).
49. See United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1978)(obligation of trial judge);
cf. State v. Lopez, 406 P.2d 941, 943 (Wash. 1965)(at trial judge's discretion).

50. United States v. Price. 573 F.2d 356. 365 (5th Cir. 1978).
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reexamination also remains within the discretion of the trial judge.", As a
further protection of the rights of defendants, Price comes into effect when
the Speedy Trial Act leaves off, at the jury selection stage.-" Like the
Speedy Trial Act, which promotes rapid processing of cases to avoid dismissal, Price encourages proceeding to trial promptly in order to avoid the
would take up more time on the already
supplemental voir dire which
3
5
congested court calendar.

The court's decision in Price promotes the criminal defendant's right to
an impartial jury as guaranteed by the sixth amendment and as implemented through the exercise of peremptory challenges and challenges for
cause. "' Without the additional voir dire that is afforded by Price the
parties would not have all of the information that is needed for effective
exercise of challenges. 5" By means of the supplemental voir dire, counsel
is able to determine if events during the interim have prejudiced a previously impartial juror.56
Price is a logical extension of the decisions in Mutchler and Jefferson,
as it continues the effort of the Fifth Circuit to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. The decision raises an
important problem, however, that the court did not address. It remains
unclear whether delay caused by continuances based on motions by the
51. See id. at 365 (holding only adds duty to conduct supplemental voir dire, not how it
is to be conducted); cf. Kreuter v. United States, 376 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1967)(method
used in voir dire), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1015 (1968); Howard v. Swenson, 293 F. Supp. 18,
22 (E.D. Mo. 1967)(extent of voir dire), aff'd, 404 F.2d 469, 473 (8th Cir. 1968).
52. See United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 1978) (applicable after significant delay between jury selection and trial); 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp. V 1975) (Act applies
up to commencement of trial); Black, The Speedy Trial Act-Justice on the Assembly Line,
8 ST. MARY's L.J. 225, 251 (1976) (Act only applies up to time of jury selection).
53. See generally Black, The Speedy Trial Act-Justice on the Assembly Line, 8 ST.
MARY's L.J. 225 (1976); Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the Federal Courts, 8 ST.
MARY's L.J. 407 (1976); Rubin, How Can We Improve JudicialTreatment of IndividualCases
Without Sacrificing Individual Rights: The Problems of the Criminal Law, 70 F.R.D. 176
(1976)(address delivered at the National Conference on the Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice).
54. See United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Blount,
479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973); 2 C. WIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 384, at
43 (1969).
55. See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950)(parties entitled to opportunity to show prejudice of juror); United States v. Mutchler, 559 F.2d 955, 958 (5th Cir.
1977)(prior information useless after interim jury service), opinion amended, 566 F.2d 1044
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir.)(counsel entitled to
information needed for peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 297 (1977); United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972)(must have reasonable assurance that
any bias will be discovered), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); Casias v. United States, 315
F.2d 614, 615 (10th Cir.)(per curiam)(must have opportunity to show actual bias), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 845 (1963).
56. United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1978); see Crane v. State, 100 S.W.
422, 430 (Mo. 1907)(adverse publicity in interim); State v. Hottman, 94 S.W. 237, 241 (Mo.
1906)(adverse publicity in interim).
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